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Abstract 
The paper presents aconnectionist framework that is capable of representing and learning propo- 
sitional knowledge. An extended version of propositional calculus is developed and is demonstrated 
to be useful for nonmonotonic reasoning, dealing with conflicting beliefs and for coping with in- 
consistency generated by unreliable knowledge sources. Formulas of the extended calculus are 
proved to be equivalent in a very strong sense to symmetric networks (like Hopfield networks and 
Boltzmann machines), and efficient algorithms are given for translating back and forth between 
the two forms of knowledge representation. A fast learning procedure is presented that allows 
symmetric networks to learn representations of unknown logic formulas by looking at examples. 
A connectionist inference engine is then sketched whose knowledge is either compiled from a 
symbolic representation or learned inductively from training examples. Experiments with large 
scale randomly generated formulas suggest hat the parallel local search that is executed by the 
networks is extremely fast on average. Finally, it is shown that the extended logic can be used as 
a high-level specification language for connectionist networks, into which several recent symbolic 
systems may be mapped. The paper demonstrates how a rigorous bridge can be constructed that 
ties together the (sometimes opposing) connectionist and symbolic approaches. 
1. Intmduction 
Humans seem to be able to reason about the surrounding world from a noisy and 
incomplete knowledge with remarkably high speed. They are astoundingly good at infer- 
ring useful and reliable information even from conflicting beliefs and from a knowledge 
that is self-contradicting and sometimes even erroneous. 
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It has been more than a decade now that AI has realized that the analysis of such 
reasoning mechanisms is a major task. As a result, many nonmonotonic systems have 
been proposed as formal models for this kind of reasoning. Some well known examples 
are circumscription 1321 and default logic 1531. 
Research in nonmonotonic reasoning has tried to understand the basic mechanisms 
and the rationale behind our intuition when dealing with incomplete description of the 
world. Recent nonmonotonic systems are quite successful in capturing our intuitions 
(for examples see [ IO, 621). Most systems, however, are still plagued with intractable 
computational complexity, sensitivity to noise and inflexibility to adjust themselves 
to new situations, to revise their knowledge and to develop personal intuitions. The 
symbolic approach is too rigid and specialized and is too constrained to be able to 
deal with exceptions to rules or with the fuzzy or approximate aspects of knowledge 
(351. 
Connectionist systems may be the missing link. They can provide us with a fast, noise- 
tolerant, adaptive platform, and their ability to learn may be used to dynamically change 
the knowledge base, to achieve robustness and to accelerate the system’s performance 
in familiar situations. 
While scientists in traditional, symbolic AI were concentrating on development of 
powerful knowledge representation systems, connectionists were concentrating on pow- 
erful learning and adaptation mechanisms. Connectionism was criticized for lacking 
mechanisms like compositionality and systematicity, which are essential for high-level 
cognitive tasks and are easy for symbolic approaches [8]. We would like to have sys- 
tems that have sufficient expressive power, that perform fast and that are capable of 
learning and adjusting. “Clearly, the ultimate goal for both scientific approaches is to 
find efficient learning procedures for representationally powerful systems” [ 161, Once 
symbolic computations are mapped into the connectionist platform, the hope is that the 
fuzzy, heuristic and adaptive capabilities of the connectionist approach will be more 
naturally integrated with the expressive but rigid symbolic approach. ’
This article concentrates on the somewhat neglected problem of symbolic knowl- 
edge representation in connectionist networks. In particular it studies networks that can 
represent and learn unrestricted propositional’ rules. 
One big difference between connectionist networks and symbolic knowledge represen- 
tations is that symbolic systems need an interpreter to process the information expressed 
in the representation, and to reason with it. Connectionist networks have no such inter- 
preter. The interpreter and the control mechanism should be included in the knowledge 
that is being represented. We strive therefore to find a connectionist representation that 
is capable of representing the information, as well as the procedural knowledge that is 
needed for controlling the reasoning process. 
Among the different connectionist models, I choose to consider those with a sym- 
metric matrix of weights. This family of models includes Hopfield networks [20,21 J, 
Boltzmann machines [ 171, harmony theory [63], mean field theory [ 151, and other 
’ Following Marvin Minsky’s call for synthesizing the symbolic and connectionist approaches ( 35 I 
? The approach can be extended to represent predicate logic as well I43 1. 
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variations. The reasons for selecting symmetric connection& networks (SCNs) are the 
following: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
symmetric networks can be characterized by energy functions which make it 
easier to specify the networks’ behavior [7]; 
symmetric networks were used to express and approximate “hard” problems 
[221i3 
symmetric networks are capable of representing a large set of asymmetric net- 
works [42] ; therefore they are quite powerful, and we will not lose expressive 
power if we restrict ourselves to the symmetric case. 4 
recent, successful, heuristic repair techniques [ 33,571 have very similar structure 
and may be seen as sequential variations of the symmetric paradigm. 
Ideally, we would like a wide range of logical formalisms to be representable in 
connectionist networks; however, we will be satisfied even if only some but general 
nonmonotonic paradigms will be mapped. Also, it would be beneficial if we had a 
formal, declarative language that is capable of describing the knowledge encapsulated 
in a network. Such high-level, declarative language may then be used for specification 
and “programming” of connectionist networks. It may be used also as an intermediate 
level of abstraction between high-level cognitive processes and their low-level neural 
implementation. 
My purpose in this article is to show that ( 1) propositional nonmonotonic knowledge 
can be captured naturally in SCNs; (2) any knowledge that is encapsulated in any 
SCN can be described by an extended version of propositional logic; (3) SCNs can 
learn representations of unknown propositional formulas by looking at examples of truth 
assignments that satisfy the formulas; (4) SCNs can be used as inference mechanisms 
that are able of capturing both the information embedded in the logic formulas as well 
as the procedural knowledge used for control; and finally, (5) the algorithm used by 
SCNs can be compared favorably to the best-known algorithms for propositional logic 
satisfiability. 
The paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 presents penalty logic, its 
semantics and its proof theory. The section demonstrates the usefulness of the new 
logic for nonmonotonic reasoning. In Section 3, symmetric connectionist networks are 
introduced and the energy paradigm is reviewed. Section 4 defines equivalence between 
forms of knowledge representation and proves a strong equivalence between penalty 
logic formulas and SCNs. It shows how to represent sentences of penalty logic in SCNs 
and how every SCN may be described using the extended logic. Section 5 sketches a 
connectionist inference engine that uses the representation discussed. Section 6 discusses 
a learning algorithm that enables SCNs to learn representations of unknown propositional 
formulas inductively. Section 7 reports experiments that were performed to evaluate the 
performance of the approach. Section 8 discusses related work, and Section 9 concludes. 
s The TSP experiments of Hopfield and Tank [22] were criticized by Wilson and Pawley [67]; however, 
later formulations of the energy function as well as modifications to the Hopfield architecture, provided better 
and more encouraging results [ 2,23,39]. 
4 Sometimes an asymmetric form of a symmetric network will perform better; therefore, for efficiency, we 
may consider not to restrict ourselves to the symmetric case. 
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1’11 extend propositional calculus in order to make it useful for nonmonotonic reason- 
ing and for coping with inconsistency. Later, this calculus will be mapped into SCNs, 
and a strong relationship between the logic and the networks will be revealed. 
The extended calculus is capable of expressing strength of belief, reliability of sources 
of knowledge, etc.. by adding a real positive number (penalty) to every belief. This 
penalty may be assigned a variety of interpretations, for example, the numbers may 
represent “certainties” or “likelihoods” as in [ 6,611, priorities as in [ 3,291 or maximal 
entropy constraints as in [ 111. When the knowledge sources are unreliable, a penalty 
may represent a measure of reliability [ 5 I]. Note that some of these systems compute 
the penalties from less explicit information, while other systems let the user specify the 
penalties explicitly. 5 I do not insist on a particular use or interpretation of the penalties, 
since the intention is to develop a general framework into which many logicist systems 
could be reduced (possibly with a variety of interpretations). 
2.1. Extending propositional calculus 
Definition 2.1. A penalty logic well formed formula (PLOFF) (I, is a finite set of 
pairs. Each pair is composed of a real positive number, called penalty, and a standard 
propositional formula, called assumption (or belief); i.e., @ = {(pi, 40;) 1 pi E lR+, pi is 
a WFF, i= I,..., n}. 
The set of the beliefs that are in $ (denoted by 24~l) is &, = {pi j (pi, pi) E $}. 
Example 2.2. The Nixon diamond can be stated as: 
1000 N + R Nixon is a republican 
1000 N--tQ Nixon is also a quaker 
10 R--t7P republicans tend not to be pacifist 
10 Q-P quakers tend to be pacifist 
3000 N the person we reason about is Nixon 
An illustration of the example is shown in Fig. I. 
The set of the beliefs in the example is inconsistent; however, the penalties in this 
example reflect the strength with which we believe in each proposition. High penalty is 
given to strict logic rules (facts), like the one that states that Nixon is a republican. We 
cannot allow strict facts to be defeated. The last fact (N) states that Nixon is the one 
we reason about. This fact receives the highest penalty of all since it is considered as 
evidence. The evidence is not usually part of our knowledge base and we would like to 
“jump” to conclusions once it is given. The evidence in this case is considered temporary 
(corrigible) but very certain (infallible). Lower penalties are given to “defeasible” rules 
(“tend to be” rules), like the one that states that republicans tend not to be pacifist. 
s The penalties may be acquired by learning; thus, subjective intuition is captured. 
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Fig. I. An illustration of the Nixon diamond as an inheritance network: nodes represent atomic propositions; 
the numbers are the penalties. 
When we know that somebody is a republican, we tend to believe that the person is not 
pacifist (by default) ; however, this “jumping” to conclusion is blocked, if we know that 
the person is an exception to the rule. For example, we wouldn’t like to conclude that 
a quaker is pacifist, if the person is also a republican, or if it was explicitly mentioned 
that the person is not pacifist. Clearly, we would like to conclude that Nixon is both a 
republican (R) and a quaker (Q) ; however, we would not like to conclude anything 
about the pacifism of Nixon. There is no adequate reason to believe either in P or in 
-P; therefore P is considered ambiguous. 
If we want to express the belief that religious ideas are stronger than political affilia- 
tions in influencing one’s pacifism, then we may increase the penalty for Q + P to 15; 
leaving the penalty for R -+ TP unchanged (10). 
Example 2.3. 
1000 N + R 
1000 N-Q 
10 R+yP 
15 Q-P 
3000N 
Nixon is a republican 
Nixon is also a quaker 
republican tend not to be pacifist 
quakers tend to be pacifist 
the person we reason about is Nixon. 
In the revised set of assumptions, we have two competing arguments. One argument 
supports the pacifism of Nixon while the other supports its negation. The pacifism of 
Nixon is not ambiguous in this case, since the argument that supports P wins the 
competition (the winning argument is stronger and therefore manages to defeat the 
disagreeing argument [ 301) . 
2.2. Model theory 
There are many ways to interpret the penalties and the assumptions in our formalism. 
I shall give one such interpretation that is convenient yet general. 
Given a knowledge base Cc, = {(pi, pi)}, the PLOFF 9 determines a ranking over the 
set of all possible models (truth assignments of n atomic propositions). This ranking 
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reflects “normality” or “goodness” we tend to associate with possible models of the 
world (see [ 601 ). By specifying @. we mean informally that models that satisfy many 
“important” assumptions are “better” than models that satisfy fewer or less important 
assumptions. Every two models may always be compared by looking at the assumptions 
(in Q) that are violated. Two models that violate the same set of assumptions are 
considered to be “equally good”. Even if the models violate different or intersecting 
sets of assumptions but the sum of the penalties of both sets is the same, then the two 
models are “equally good”. A model is more “normal” (or “better”) than another model 
if the sum of the penalties of the violated assumptions of the first is less than the sum of 
the penalties violated by the second. For further motivation for summing the penalties 
see [6,11]. 
This interpretation of the penalties induces a ranking function that assigns a real value 
(rank) to all the possible models. The ranking function that is induced is called the 
violation rank of 4: 
Definition 2.4. The violation mnk of a PLOFF I,+ is the function (Vrank,) that assigns 
a real-valued rank to each of the truth assignments. The Vrunk+ for a truth assignment 
2 is computed by summing the penalties for the assumptions of Cc, that are violated by 
the assignment; i.e.. Vrunkk (2) = ci&i,, p,. ’ 
Definition 2.5. The models that minimize the Vrankg function are called the preferred 
models of @; i.e., {.? / miny{ Vrunk+ (y3 } = Vrank* (2)). The set of all preferred models 
is denoted by rl/,. 
Definition 2.6. Let p, 9 be PLOFFs, a PLOFF I& semantically entails 40 (rC, k (D) iff 
all the preferred models of 4/, are also the preferred models of p; i.e., r, C r+,. 
Note that a sentence @ therefore entails (o iff any model that minimizes the violation 
rank of $, also minimizes the violation rank of 9. 
In the Nixon example, there are only two preferred models: (N, R, Q, P) and 
(N, R, Q, -P>. Examples of some valid conclusions are therefore N, R A Q, etc. (since 
these conclusions are satisfied by all the preferred models). The pacifism of Nixon is 
ambiguous, since P holds in one preferred model while 1P holds in the other. 
2.3. Merging PLOFFs, evidence and background knowledge 
The operator merge (6) in the metalanguage, plays the role of A (AND) in classic 
propositional logic. It allows us to combine two PLOFFs simply by merging them. 
Definition 2.7. The merge operation (6) is defined: 
lcIl ii $2 = (rcII - rcI2) u ($2 - $1) U { (2Pi, Vi) 1 (pi9 Pi) E @I fl442). 
’ A Score (a number) is actually computed by the function hank. This score is later used to determine the 
relative rank of the truth assignment. 
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The meaning of a merge of two or more PLOPPs is simply obtained by adding the 
appropriate Vrank functions. The reader may check that 
Vrank 
*b 
= Vrank$ + Vrank$, . 
The merge operation therefore allows us an incremental update of the knowledge. 
Later, after the equivalence of networks and logic formulas is established, we’ll see 
that this property allows one to add (delete) a PLOPF to an existing network only by 
adding (deleting) the relevant energy terms. There is no need to re-compute the new 
network all over again when some updates occur. 
Nonmonotonic systems “jump” to conclusions based on a given evidence, and later 
may retract those conclusions based on a new evidence. It is therefore convenient to 
decompose the knowledge from which we want to reason, into “background” knowledge 
and “evidence” [ 10,491. The background knowledge is relatively fixed, and there should 
be an easy way to combine evidence with it. In our formalism, combining the evidence 
is simply done by merging the evidence and the background or adding together the two 
ranking functions. 
Definition 2.8. Let t,b, e, q~ be PLOFPs. Evidence e entails C+Y with respect to a back- 
ground knowledge $ (e +* cp), iff $ 6 e b 9. The consequence r lation induced by (I, 
is the set of all pairs (e,cp) such that e b’ (p. 
One special case of this definition is when the evidence is strict; i.e., its validity 
is certain. This special case is very useful, and indeed, in most reasoning systems the 
evidence is never defeated, and the agent draws conclusions based on the absolute 
validity of the evidence (e.g., [ lo] ) . To represent a strict evidence e in penalty logic, 
the set Z& should be consistent and the penalties that are assigned to the assumptions 
should be higher than any other combination of background beliefs (the penalties are 
practically infinite). 
Definition 2.9. Strict evidence is a PLOFF e = {(co, ei)} such that the set U, = {ei} is 
consistent and cc represents a large penalty (larger than any combination of background 
beliefs). 
Example 2.10. In the Nixon diamond the following beliefs are considered background: 
1000 N --+ R Nixon is a republican. 
1000 N -+ Q Nixon is also a quaker. 
10 R-+yP republicans tend not to be pacifist. 
10 Q-P quakers tend to be pacifist. 
The fact (3000, N) is strict evidence that triggers for example the conclusion of Q A R. 
Another example of strict evidence is (3000, -Q) that triggers the conclusion TN. 
Penalty logic is nonmonotonic since sometimes conclusions need to be retracted when 
new evidence is added. In the example, when there is an evidence that someone is a 
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quaker the conclusion is that he or she is also pacifist. If in addition, we add the evidence 
that Nixon is that someone, we need to retract the conclusion. 
Loyal to the goal of being as genera1 as possible, 1’11 not restrict the evidence to being 
strict. Such generalization is not mere formality, and has its direct uses. Defeasible 
evidence is a phenomenon encountered in many practical applications. For example, 
when the evidence is obtained via sensory devices that are unreliable, redundant and 
noisy, our agent may “not believe its own eyes” if the evidence conflicts with some 
highly reliable facts of the background knowledge. 
As with evidence, conclusions need not be strict. Most symbolic systems treat a 
conclusion as a strict proposition that either follows from the background knowledge, or 
its negation follows, or is ambiguous. Penalty logic allows conclusions to be stated as 
PLOFFs (with penalties). Thus, such conclusions may arrive for example as queries via 
noisy channels. The query we wish to prove may therefore be redundant and unreliable 
exactly as the evidence and the background knowledge. Thus, the query itself may be 
self-contradicting, yet we prove it (by definition) iff all the preferred models of the 
background evidence knowledge are also preferred models of the query. 
2.4. Proof theory 
A sound and complete proof theory can be shown for penalty logic. This proof theory 
is based solely on syntactic considerations, and gives a clarifying look on the reasoning 
process in penalty logic. 
Instead of ranking the models and using the “best” models for the reasoning process, 
we can rank consistent subsets of the assumptions of $, and use the “best” (preferred) 
consistent subsets to perform deduction. A conclusion is made in the proof theory iff 
all the preferred consistent subsets entail it. 
Definition 2.11. A set T is called a theory of a PLOFF Cc, iff T is a consistent subset 
of the assumptions in $; i.e., the set T C: ZA, has at least one satisfying model. 
Definition 2.12. The penalty function of a theory T of @ is the function obtained 
by summing the penalties of the assumptions in @ that are not included in T; i.e., 
penabti CT) = Cv,E(~d,-~) P;. 
A ranking is therefore induced by $ over the set of theories of (CI. This ranking is 
computed by summing the penalties of the missing assumptions. 
Definition 2.13. A preferred theory of y3 is a theory T that minimizes the penalty 
function of q+; i.e., The set of the preferred theories of 9 is T$ = {T / penalty+(T) = 
mins{penal& (S) 1 S is a theory of $} T is a theory of $}. 
Definition 2.14. Let rc/, q be PLOFFs, let T+ = {E} the set of all preferred theories of 
q, and let Tq = {T/} the set of all preferred theories of 4p. We say the @ entails7 rp 
’ Note that the deductive closure of preferred theories roughly resemble “extensions” (as in [ 531). The 
definition of entailment in penalty logic resembles therefore entailment by intersection of all extensions. 
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(denoted by $ b rp) iff all the preferred theories c of $ entail (in the classical sense) 
the disjunction of all the preferred theories of rp; i.e., 
As a special case, consider the case where the conclusion sp is strict (rp is a consistent 
propositional well formed formula). A PLOPS $ entails rp iff every preferred theory of 
Cc, entails cp in the classical sense of entailment. 
In the Nixon example, the assumptions are conflicting (inconsistent set); however, 
there are 25 - 2 non-empty consistent subsets where at least one belief of $ is missing. 
If we rank each of the consistent subsets by summing the penalties of the missing 
beliefs, we get that the preferred theories are TI = {N, N --+ Q, N + R, Q + P} and 
T2=(N,N+Q,N+R,R + -IP}. These preferred theories are each ranked 10 since 
only one belief in (/I (of strength IO) is missing in each such theory. 
Each of the two preferred theories entails the obvious conclusions (like N, Q A R) , but 
neither P nor 1P can be concluded, since the two preferred theories agree on neither. 
The reasoning process can be intuitively understood as a competition among consistent 
subsets. The subsets that win are those theories with minimal penalty. A conclusion is 
entailed only if all the winners conclude it independently. 
We’ll need the next two lemmas to show that the proof theory is sound and com- 
plete. 
Lemma 2.15. Let T C L& be a consistent subset of the assumptions in +. The subset 
T is maximal-consistent ’ in $ if every model that satisfies T has a violation rank 
equal to the penalty of T; i.e., T is a maximal-consistent subset iff (VZ) if x’ b T then 
penalty+ (T) = Vranke (2). 
Proof. If T is a maximal-consistent subset of +, the assumptions in @ that are left 
out of T are also the assumptions that are violated by any model x’ that satisfies T 
(otherwise such assumptions are consistent with T and therefore T is not maximal). 
Also, every assumption that is violated by a model x’ that satisfies T cannot be in T. 
Therefore, if T is a maximal-consistent subset then for every model x’ of T, the set of 
missing assumptions in T is equal to the set of assumptions violated by I Therefore 
penalty+ (T) = Vranke (2). 
Assume that every model x’ that satisfies T has Vranke (2) = penalty@ (T) . If T is not 
maximal-consistent then there is an assumption in @ that can be included into T and 
have a model x’ satisfying both T and the new assumption. The violation rank of x’ must 
be lower than the penalty of T since the set of assumptions not included in T subsumes 
the set of assumptions violated by x’ and contains at least one assumption not violated 
by 3, i.e., Vrank,+ (2) < penalye( This is a contradiction with the assumption that 
penalty* (T) = Vranke (2). 0 
8 A subset T is maximal-consistent if no other assumption of $ can be added to T while still preserving the 
consistency of the set. 
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The reader may observe that any preferred theory of I& is a maximal-consistent subset 
of LIti and therefore the penalty of a preferred theory is equal to the violation rank of its 
satisfying models. This allows us to use a proof-theoretic ranking function (pen&+) 
instead of the model-theoretic function ( Vrmk, ). 
The next lemma establishes the relationship between preferred models and preferred 
theories. 
Lemma 2.16. A model xf is u preferred model of a PLOFF Cc, iff model 2 satisfies some 
preferred theory of $. 
Proof. If x’ is a preferred model of ti then it minimizes Vranke. Let T be the set 
composed of all assumptions in Q that are satisfied by X: Since the assumptions that are 
violated by x’ are exactly those that are not included in T, we deduce that Vrunk,,, (2) = 
penaltyti(T). But if T is not a preferred theory then there exists a preferred theory T’ 
such that penalty+ (T’) < penal&,(T). By Lemma 2.15, the models .v’ that satisfy T’ 
have Vrunk+ (q) = penaltyd, (T’), and we conclude that 
Vrunk, (q) = penaltyti CT’) < penalty,,, ( T) = Vrank$ (2) 
This is a contradiction to the minimality of Vrunk( 2). 
If .? is a model of a preferred theory T of c// then T minimizes the penalty function 
and is maximal-consistent. By Lemma 2.15, Vrank,( 2) = penalty~(T). If x’ is not a 
preferred model of Ic, then there must be a preferred model .v’ such that Vrank$ (j’) < 
Vrank, (2). Let T’ the set of all assumptions of fl satisfied by j? The set T’ has 
penaltJti (T’) = Vrank, (7). since the set of the assumptions violated by .v’ is equal to 
the set of assumptions not included in T’. Therefore, 
penalty~ (T’ ) = Vrunk,,, (j7 < Vrunk$ ( 2) = penalty$ (T) , 
in contradiction to the minimality of penalty$ (T). U 
Theorem 2.17. The proof procedure is sound and complete; i.e., $ b p iff 1+4 I- p. 
Proof. If I) b rp then every preferred model of $ is also a preferred model of p. Based 
on lemma 2.16, every preferred model of 4 satisfies some preferred theory T of @ 
and also satisfies some preferred theory of p. Therefore, every preferred model of t,4 
satisfies the disjunction of the preferred theories of p. From lemma 2.16 every model 
that satisfies a preferred theory T of Cc, is also a preferred model of 9 and therefore 
satisfies the disjunction of the preferred theories of p; i.e., T I- VTiETq T/. We conclude 
therefor that I+!J /- C,D. 
If IJ I- p then every model that satisfies a preferred theory T of @ also satisfies a 
preferred theory T’ of 9. From lemma 2.16, a model that satisfies T’ is also a preferred 
model of cp and therefore, every model that satisfies T is also a preferred model of cp. 
Based on lemma 2.16 every preferred model T of rC, satisfies some preferred theory 
of $ and therefore is a preferred model of p (l-e c r,), We therefore conclude that 
*kP 0 
G. Pinkas/Artificial Intelligence 77 (1995) 203-247 213 
This sound and complete proof mechanism of competing theories is useful for both 
dealing with inconsistency in the knowledge base and for defeasible reasoning. For ex- 
ample, when we detect inconsistency, we usually want to adopt a theory with maximum 
cardinality (since we assume that only a minority of the observations are erroneous). In- 
deed, in penalty logic, when all the penalties are one, the theories that win have maximal 
cardinality and only a minority of the assumptions is defeated. Thus, minimum penalty 
means maximum cardinality. Penalty logic is therefore a generalization of the maximal 
cardinality principle which is useful when coping with noisy knowledge sources. For 
defeasible reasoning, the notion of conflicting theories can be used to decide between 
conflicting sets of arguments. Intuitively, a set of arguments Al defeats a conflicting set 
of arguments A:! if A1 is supported by a “better” theory than all the theories that support 
A:! (see [ 30,621 for a discussion on argument systems). 
Example 2.18. Two levels of blocking (from [ 31) : 
1 meeting I usually go to the Monday meeting. 
10 sick + (lmeeting) If I’m sick I usually don’t go to the meeting. 
100 cold-only -+ meeting If I have only a cold then I tend go to the 
meeting. 
1000 cold-only -+ sick If I have a cold it means I’m sick. 
Without any additional evidence, all the assumptions are consistent, and we can infer 
that “meeting” is true (from the first assumption). However, given the evidence that 
“sick” is true, we prefer theories that falsify “meeting” and “cold-only”, since the second 
assumption has greater penalty than the competing first assumption (the only theory that 
wins does not include the first assumption). If we include the evidence “cold-only” then 
the theory that previously won loses now, and the new winner is the theory that does not 
include the second assumption. As a result, the conclusion “meeting” is drawn despite 
the fact that “sick” is also concluded. 
3. Symmetric models and energy functions 
This section reviews symmetric connectionist models and the energy minimization 
paradigm. Later, we’ll show the relationship between this paradigm and penalty logic. 
3.1. What are symmetric networks? 
A symmetric connectionist network (SCN) is characterized by a weighted undirected 
graph whose nodes represent processing units and whose arcs represent weighted con- 
nections (see Fig. 2). There are two kinds of arcs: pairwise arcs that link two nodes, 
and monadic arcs that are each attached to a single node. A pairwise arc represents a 
weighted connection (wi,j), while a monadic arc represents a bias (a threshold with 
reverse sign) given to a single unit. The weights of the connections can be stored in 
a symmetric matrix whose diagonal is zero. The value of the i, j position within the 
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matrix represents the weight of the connection that directs the output of unit i into unit 
j. The matrix is symmetric, since the weight from unit i to unit j is equal to the weight 
from unit j to unit i (i.e., w ,,,, = w,,,, ). 
An SCN may be viewed as searching for a global minimum of some quadratic function 
called the energy. Each unit asynchronously computes the gradient 9 of the function and 
adjust its activation value, so that energy decreases gradually. lo The network eventually 
reaches equilibrium, settling on either a local or a global minimum. 
There is a direct mapping between these networks and the quadratic energy functions 
they minimize. Given a function, we can construct the network that tries to minimize it, 
and given a network, we can generate the appropriate function that is minimized. The 
variables of the function map into nodes in the graph: hidden variables are mapped into 
hidden units and visible variables are mapped into visible units. Each node is connected 
by symmetric arcs to other units. Unit i is connected to unit j by a weight w iff the 
energy function includes a term of the form -WX;Xj. A unit i has a nonzero bias 8 
(which is sometimes viewed as the threshold -0) iff the energy function includes a 
term of the form: -0x;. 
A network is fully specified by its energy function and for the remainder of this paper, 
I will not distinguish between them. The terms “networks” and “energy functions” will 
be used interchangeably. 
Fig. 2. A symmettic network that represents the function E = 2RN - 2NT - XT - 2WT - WN 
+5T+W+S-N-R 
3.2. Activation functions 
Each unit in the network computes an activation value (Xi) between zero and one 
as follows. The unit first computes the weighted sum of the inputs it receives from its 
neighbors, which is the gradient of the energy function with reverse sign 
net, = -- = 
‘) The weighted sum of the inputs minus the threshold is actually the partial derivative -dE/dX;, where E is 
the energy function. 
‘(’ In the stochastic models, noise is introduced and the energy may not be decreasing all the times. 
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The sum is then used as the input for some activation function F (usually nonlinear and 
nondecreasing) 
Xi = F(neti), 
whose task is to change the activation value according to the energy steepness. Different 
connectionist models may have different activation functions. The network may be 
viewed, therefore, as performing a form of gradient descent on the energy landscape. 
Some of the most popular symmetric models are described in the following subsections. 
3.2.1. The discrete Hopfield model 
The discrete Hopfield model [20] uses binary-valued units whose activation values 
are either zero or one. The activation function F is 
Xi = 
1, ifWti>O, 
0, otherwise. 
This model searches the corners of the hyper-cube corresponding to the possible values of 
the units. The discrete Hopfield model finds a local minimum very quickly;” however, 
many times this local minimum will be a shallow one, and the network will not be able 
to escape to a deeper minimum. 
3.2.2. The analog model of Hopjield and Tank 
In Hopfield and Tank networks [21] the activation values are continuous between 
zero and one and the search takes place in the interior of the hyper-cube. By beginning 
near the center of the cube and searching using gradient descent, the network has better 
chances of finding a global minimum. There are no guarantees that a global minimum 
will be found, but good results have been reported for several problems. Hopfield and 
Tank use an analog circuit for their implementation and, therefore the energy function 
had to be modified slightly: 
where Ri is the input resistance to unit i, g(s) is the sigmoidal function with gain A 
1 
g(s) = ~ 
1 + e2As ’
and g-’ is the inverse of g. At high (infinite) gain the minima lie at the corners of the 
search space in the same locations as those of the discrete Hopfield model. The discrete 
and analog models collapse, therefore, into one at infinite gain. 
’ ’ Fast on average but exponential in worst case [ 241. 
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3.2.3. Boltzmann machines 
The Boltzmann machine [ 171 has binary units as in the discrete Hopfield model. The 
important difference is that the activation rule is stochastic and the system is annealed 
starting in a high temperature and slowly cooling it down to a lower temperature. The 
energy gradient neti is used to determine the probability that a unit adopts the one state: 
P(X,=l)= ’ 
1 + e-net,lT ’ 
where T is the temperature of the annealing. With this stochastic rule, the network is 
more likely to adopt low energy states as the temperature cools down. The energy does 
not decrease monotonically as in the previous models; instead, it will go uphill randomly, 
with a frequency that is decreasing with the temperature. It can, therefore, search several 
minima at the same time, exploring a wide range of possibilities at high temperature 
but concentrating (spending more time) on deeper minima at lower temperature. A 
Boltzmann machine can theoretically be run long enough to guarantee that a global 
minimum is found [9]; however. in practice it is not easy to find such “sure” annealing 
schedules. 
An annealing schedule can be designed to lit a given time quota. Given a bound on 
time resources, we can make the system obtain its lowest temperature within the bound, 
thus providing an “any-time” answer. The system is not guaranteed to find a global 
minimum at the end of such time quota; however, as more time is given, deeper minima 
may be found and the probability of finding a global solution increases. 
3.2.4. Deterministic Boltzmann machines-mean jield theory 
A mean field method suggested by Peterson and Hartman [38] appears to reduce the 
excessive time in Boltzmann machines that is wasted on the stochastic hill climbing. 
The method is based on deterministically approximating the probability of a Boltzmann 
unit to be one and encoding this probability in the activation function: 
X, = tanh F 
( 1 
Mean field annealing is performed similarly to the annealing in Boltzmann machines, 
but the process is not stochastic. Peterson and Anderson found this procedure to be 
lo-30 times faster than the stochastic process in Boltzmann machines and also reported 
that somewhat better results (deeper minima) were found. As in Boltzmann machines, 
mean field annealing may be designed to fit the time resources, thus providing us with 
a desired any-time property. 
3.2.5. Heuristic repair methods 
Recently, repair methods based on local search have been proposed for NP-hard 
search problems. The techniques were shown to be successful for large scale (hard) 
distributions of problems such as constraint satisfaction, n-queen, scheduling and 3-SAT 
[33,57]. 
In these methods, the distance between the current state and a goal is measured and 
the function is being minimized using local search. Each of the variables of the problem 
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is checked for the effect of changing its value on the distance function. Usually, the 
change that reduces the distance the most is executed. When the energy function is taken 
as the distance function, heuristic repair may be considered as a sequential variation of 
the connectionist algorithm implemented in symmetric networks. 
Heuristic repair methods can be used therefore to implement the formalism proposed 
in this article. The distance function is the high-order energy function (weighted sum of 
violated constraints) and the problem variables are the nodes of the networks (atomic 
propositions). 
3.3. High-order energy functions 
To represent arbitrary logic formulas, a network will need the power of either high- 
order connections or hidden units. This section reviews high-order networks, and shows 
how to convert them into standard (pairwise) networks by introducing new hidden units. 
High-order connectionist networks have sigma-pi units [ 551 with multiplicative con- 
nections. Symmetric networks can be easily extended to handle high-order connections. 
Naturally, such networks may be viewed as minimizing high-order energy functions 
[561. 
A k-order energy function is a function E : (0, 1)” -+ R that can be expressed as 
sum of products, with product terms of up to k variables. A k-order energy function is 
denoted by: 
E’(x~,...,x,) 
= 
c --Wil,...,itXil f ’ ’ -%k 
1 (il<iz<~..<it<n 
Quadratic energy functions (or second-order functions) are special cases of the high- 
order case: 
c -WijXiXj + C -WiXi. 
1 <i<j<n i(n 
In the high-order model each node is assigned a sigma-pi unit that updates its activation 
value by first computing the partial derivative of the energy function and then update 
the activation value accordingly: 
W = -a = 
dE c 
wil.....i....& ,<j<kij2i 
rI 
Xij 9 
I,“‘l”‘lk \.. 
Ui = F(tM?ti), 
where ai = F(neti) is the standard update rule that is unique to the model we wish 
to extend. In the discrete Hopfield model for example, F(neti) = 1 if neti > 0, and 
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F(rret;) = 0 otherwise. A high-order network (see Fig. 3) is a hyper-graph, where k- 
order are translated hyper-arcs connecting k nodes. The arcs are not directed 
(the weight is the same for every node that is part of the arc) and the weight of an arc 
is determined by the weight of the corresponding term in the energy function (with an 
opposite sign). As in the quadratic case, there is a translation back and forth between k- 
order energy functions and symmetric high-order networks with k-order sigma-pi units. 
Fig. 3. A cubic network that represents I:‘ = NSW + 2RN ~- WN + W + S - R - N using sigma-pi units and 
u cubic hyper-arc (it is equivalent to the network of Fig. 2. without the hidden unit T). 
We can arbitrarily divide the variables of an energy function into two sets: visible 
variables and hidden variables. The hidden variables correspond to the hidden units of 
the network, and the visible variables correspond to the visible units. An energy function 
with both hidden and visible variables is denoted usually as a function E(x’, <), where 
I represents the visible variables and Trepresents the hidden variables. 
An assignment of zeros and ones to the visible variables is called a visible state. 
The values of the visible units after an equilibrium is reached, are considered as the 
“answer” of the network. 
Later in this article, I’ll interpret visible states as truth assignments: the visible vari- 
ables are viewed as atomic propositions: “1” is interpreted as “true” and “0” is interpreted 
9s “false”. 
We call the set of minimizing vectors projected onto the visible variables, “the visible 
solutions” of the minimization problem; i.e.. 
1-T / (S)E(.f,t) =min{E(J,r:)}}. 
I’.: 
Models like Boltzmann machines, harmony theory, mean field theory, may be viewed as 
searching for a global minimum ‘* of the corresponding energy functions. Local minima 
or spurious memories may exist. In general however, local minima are considered to be 
undesirable phenomena, and cause a degradation in the performance of the network. This 
article will ignore local minima that are not global, and usually they will not represent 
any meaningful knowledge. 
I2 Several global minima may also exist. all with the same energy level. 
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Definition 3.1. Let E be a symmetric network with energy function E(x’, 8, where 
? designates the hidden variables. The characteristic function of the network is the 
function: ErunkE(Z) =miny{E(x’,y3}. 
The ErunkE function defines the energy of all visible states. The energy of a visible 
state is the energy level obtained when the visible units are clamped with the state 
values, and the hidden units are free to settle so that a minimum is reached. This 
ErunkE function characterizes the network’s behavior: it is independent of the hidden 
units and it is also independent of the exact topology of the original network. There 
may be many possible networks with the same characteristic function. The next section 
uses the characteristic function to show equivalence between different networks. 
3.4. The equivalence between high-order networks and low-order networks 
The following subsection is a review of results reported in [40]. 
We call two energy functions strongly equivalent, if their corresponding characteristic 
(Erunk) functions are equal up to a constant difference; i.e: El M E2 iff ErunkE, = 
Erunke, + c. Networks that are strongly equivalent not only have the same set of global 
minima, but also have a very similar energy landscape and induce the same ordering 
on the visible states; i.e., if st and s2 are visible states then “the same ordering” means 
that Et(st) < ED iff Ez(s1) <I&(Q). 
I’ll show now an algorithm to convert any high-order network into a strongly equiv- 
alent low-order one, with additional hidden units. In addition, any energy function with 
hidden variables can be converted into a strongly equivalent, (possibly) higher-order 
network by eliminating some or all of the hidden units. These algorithms allow us to 
trade the computational power of sigma-pi units for additional simple units and vice 
versa. As a result we’ll see that the expressive power of high-order networks is the same 
as that of low-order networks with hidden units. 
Readers who are not interested in the technical details of the constructions may skip 
now to the next subsection. They may keep in mind only that the constructions for both 
directions are possible. 
Theorem 3.2. 
Any k-order term (w nt, Xi), with NEGATIVE coe$ficient w, can be replaced by 
the quadratic terms: cf_, 2wXiT - (2k - 1) wT generating a strongly equivalent 
energy function with one additional hidden variable T. 
Any k-order term (w nt, Xi), with POSITIVE coefJicient w, can be replaced by the 
terms: 
w!Xi- [$2wXiT) +2WXkT+(2k_3)WT, 
generating a strongly equivalent energy function of om’er k - 1 with one additional 
hidden variable T. 
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The proof appears in [ 44 1. 
Example 3.3. The following is a 4-order energy function with a 4-order term XYZU. It 
can be converted into a quadratic energy function using two additional hidden variables 
T and T’. 
-XY + XYZU 
=-XY+XZ-2XT-2W-2Z7+2UT+5T 
~5 -XY+XY-2XT’- 2YT’+2ZT’+3T’-2XT-2IT-2ZT 
+2UT + 5T 
=-2XT’-2kTT’+2ZT’+3T’-2X7--2YT_2ZT+2UT+5T. 
The symmetric transformation, from low-order into high-order functions by elimi- 
nating any subset of the variables, is also possible (of course we are interesting in 
eliminating only hidden variables). 
To eliminate T, bring the energy function to the form: E = E’ + oldterm, where 
oldterm = (C:=, wi @_, X., )T. 
Consider all assignments S for the variables ( X = Xi, . . Xi, ) in oldterm (not including 
T), such that 0s = C,F=, w,, ni, xl, < 0. 
Let 
L;. = 
i 
“Xi, “. if S(X,,) = 1. 
“( 1 - Xi, )“, ifS(Xi,) =O. 
it is the expression “X,” or “( 1 - X,)” depending whether the variable is assigned 1 or 
0 in S. The expression $=, Li therefore determines the state S, and the expression 
represents the disjunction of all the states that cause a reduction in the total energy. The 
new function E’ + newterm, is therefore equivalent to E’ + oldterm and does not include 
T. 
Example 3.4. 
Let T be the hidden variable to be eliminated, then: 
ABfTAC-TA+2TB-T=AB+T(AC-A+2B- I). 
The following assignments for (A. B, C) cause p to be less then zero: 
P(O.O,O, = ~ 13 P(O.0. I ) = ~~ 13 
P(l,O,O, =--2, P(l.O.l, = ~~ 1. 
The new term equals: 
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-(I--A)(l-B)(l-C) -(l-A)(l-B)C 
-2A(l -B)(l -C) -A(1 -B)C 
=-ABC+AB+AC-A+B-1. 
Therefore: 
AB+TAC-TA+2TB-T =--ABC+2AB+AC-A+B. 
4. The equivalence between penalty logic and energy minimization 
This section defines equivalence between different forms of knowledge representation 
(that use ranked-models semantics), and use this definition to show the relationships 
between penalty logic and SCNs. 
4.1. Reasoning with ranking functions 
A ranking function over a set of models is a function that assigns a real value (rank) 
to every model in the set. The ranking of a model may be considered as a grade for the 
“normality” or the “goodness” of the model. 
As we saw in previous subsection, every SCN E is characterized by the ranking 
function ErankE. Similarly, every ranking function is equal to some high-order energy 
function and therefore characterizes some SCN. I3 The search performed by the SCN 
for a global minimum may be viewed thus as a search for a model that minimizes the 
ranking function. 
Penalty logic formulas, classical logic WI%, and SCNs may be interpreted as rep- 
resentations of ranking functions. It may be useful therefore to define our reasoning 
mechanism independently of the knowledge representation form: 
Definition 4.1. Let W = (0, 1)” be the set of models defined over a set of n atomic 
propositions. A ranking function k : W -+ R is a function that maps models into reals. 
A ranking function k is strict iff the domain of k is (0, oo} (where 00 represents a 
large positive number). A preferred model x’ of a ranking function k is a model that 
minimizes k; i.e., k(T) = mina{k(y’)}. 
The set of preferred models of k is denoted rk. 
Definition 4.2. Let f, k, e be ranking functions. f is entailed from k (k k f) iff rk C 
rf. f is entailed from the background knowledge k using the evidence e (e bk f) iff 
k+ebf. 
The consequence relation induced by k is the set of all pairs {(e, f) ( e /=” f}. 
The model-based reasoning mechanism defined for penalty logic in Section 2 is 
consistent with the above definitions if Vranke is taken as the ranking function. 
IR There is no guarantee however, that the the size of the network that represents an arbitrary ranking function 
is polynomial in n (the number of visible variables). 
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4.2. Calculi to describe ranking functions 
Our next step is to describe symbolically the knowledge that is encapsulated in a rank- 
ing function. This subsection defines several languages for describing ranking function 
and shows their equivalence. Sentences of such languages are interpreted using ranked- 
models semantics, and transformations are allowed from one knowledge representation 
into another if some basic properties are preserved. 
The following definitions establish the relationship between a form of knowledge 
representation and its meaning. 
Definition 4.3. A calculus is a triple (C, m(), M), where L is a language, M is a set 
of possible models and m : L -+ {k 1 k is a ranking function} is a function that assigns 
a ranking function for each sentence of the language L. The function m(s) is called 
the interpretation of the sentence s. Let s, s’, e, k E L; a model x’ is a preferred model 
of s (x’ b s) iff x’ is a preferred model of the ranking function m(s). A sentence s 
entails sentence s’ (s k s’) if the ranking function m(s) entails the ranking function 
m( s’). Similarly, a combination of a background sentence with an evidence sentence 
is interpreted as the addition of their corresponding ranking functions; i.e., e kk s iff 
(m(e) + m(k)) b m(s). 
The consequence relation of k is the set of all pairs {(e, s) 1 e b’ s}. 
Both classic predicate logic and propositional logic can be viewed as calculi whose 
languages describe strict ranking functions. 
Example 4.4. Propositional calculus is (L, m( ), (0, I}“), where L is the language of 
propositional well formed formulas (WFFs) and m(s) outputs the function (oo( 1 - 
H,( x’) ) ) , given a formula s (03 represents a large positive real). H,( x’) is the charac- 
teristic function of the WFFs and is recursively defined as: 
X,9 if s = X, is an atomic proposition, 
1 -H,(X), if s = -G’, 
H,(T) = K,(g) x H,&), if s = 31 A ~2, 
H,,,(% + H,,(X) - Hs, (2) x H,&), 
if s = st V 3-2. 
The reader may easily observe, that any propositional WFF describes a strict ranking 
function that returns 0 for truth assignments that satisfy the WFF, and OCR for assignments 
that do not satisfy it. 
Example 4.5. Penalty logic is a calculus (Cc,, m, (0, 1)“) such that m( +) = Vrcmk+. 
Definition 4.6. Let s E LI and s’ E 1s~ be sentences of two (possibly different) calculi 
(L, m, M) and (L’, m’, M); we define three kinds of equivalence relations between them: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
G. Pinkas/Arbjkial Inrelligence 77 (1995) 203-247 223 
s is strongly equivalent to s’ (s MS s’) iff their corresponding ranking functions 
are equal, up to a constant difference; i.e., m(s) = m’(s’) + c. We call this 
equivalence “magnitude preserving” or s-equivalence. 
s is p-equivalent to s’ (s ~9 s’ > iff their associated ranking functions induce 
the same ordering over the set of models; i.e., VT, y’, m(s) (if+) < m(s) (y3 iff 
m’( s’) (x’) < m’( s’) (~3. We call this equivalence “preference preserving” or 
p-equivalence. 
s is weakly equivalent to s’ (s MW s’) iff their corresponding ranking functions 
have the same sets of satisfying models; i.e., Tmcs) = Tmr(st). We call this 
equivalence “minima preserving” or w-equivalence. 
Observations. 
( 1) If two background sentences are strongly equivalent, then for any given evidence 
e, the two corresponding sentences entail the same set of conclusions; i.e., if 
s zS s’ then for every evidence e and every conclusion c, (m(s) + m(e)) k 
m(c) iff (m’( s’) +m’( e) ) 1 m’(c) . Therefore, two strongly equivalent sentences 
have the same induced consequence relation. i.e., In addition, the probabilistic 
meaning that sometimes is associated with the ranking function is preserved 
(e.g., Boltzmann machine, [5] ), since 
(2) If two background sentences are p-equivalent, then for every strict evidence e, 
the two sentences entail the same set of conclusions; i.e., if dam(e) = (0, co} 
and s xp s’, then for every conclusion c, (m(s) + e) b m(c) iff (m’( s’) + e) k 
m’(c) . We can’t guarantee this property for any non-strict evidence. 
(3) If two sentences s, s’ are weakly equivalent, then the two sentences entail the 
same set of direct conclusions; i.e., m(s) b m(c) iff m’( s’) b m’(c). We can’t 
guarantee this property to hold once we try to add evidence. 
The reader may easily observe that if two sentences are strongly equivalent then they 
are also p-equivalent and if they are p-equivalent they are also weakly equivalent. 
If all we want is to preserve the set of conclusions achievable from a piece of 
knowledge, we may use transformations which only preserve the minima (weak equiv- 
alence). If however, we would like to be able to combine strict evidence to our trans- 
formed knowledge, we need to perform “preference preserving” transformations. We 
need “magnitude preserving” transformations (strong equivalence) if we want to com- 
bine any evidence or give probabilistic interpretation to our transformed knowledge. 
Most of our transformations in the reminder of this paper are “magnitude preserving” 
(strongly equivalent). Strong equivalence of two forms of knowledge representation 
means that the ranking functions that are induced by either these representations are the 
same (up to a constant difference). 
We define now an equivalence between two calculi. 
Definition 4.7. A calculus Cl = (C, (0, l}“, m) is (s-/p-/w-) equivalent to a calculus 
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C’ = (L’, (0, I}“, m’) iff for every s E L there exists an (s-/p-/w-) equivalent s’ E C’ 
and for every s’ E C’ there exists an (s-/p-/w-) equivalent s E L. 
We thus can use the language C to represent every ranking function that is repre- 
sentable using the language C’, and vice versa. In the sections to come, I shall present 
several equivalent calculi and show that all of them describe the knowledge embedded 
in SCNs. 
3.3. Some examples qf equivalent calculi 
Example 4.8 (The calculus of’ energy functions). The algebraic notation that was used 
to describe energy functions as sum-of-products can be viewed as a language for describ- 
ing ranking functions. The calculus qf energy functions is therefore ({E}, (0, l}“, m( )), 
where {E} is the set of all strings representing energy functions written as sum-of- 
products, and m(E) = ErankE. Two special cases are of particular interest: the calculus 
of quadratic functions and the calculus of high-order energy functions with no hidden 
variables. 
In Section 3.4, algorithms were given that ( 1) convert high-order energy functions to 
strongly equivalent i4 low-order ones with additional hidden variables, and (2) convert 
energy functions with hidden variables into strongly equivalent (possibly) higher-order 
ones without those hidden variables. We may therefore conclude that the calculus of 
high-order energy functions with no hidden units is strongly equivalent to the calculus of 
quadratic functions. Thus. we can use the language of high-order energy functions with 
no hidden units to describe any symmetric connectionist network (SCN) with arbitrary 
number of hidden units and vice versa. Note also that the calculus of SCNs, whose 
language describes graphs, weights and thresholds, is of course also strongly equivalent 
to the calculus of quadratic energy functions. 
Example 4.9 (Propositional calculus). In 1401, I showed that the satisfiability of 
propositional calculus is equivalent to quadratic energy minimization. I claim that this 
is a weak equivalence. The energy function E, is obtained from 9 using the following 
algorithm: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Convert the WFF into a conjunction of subformulas, each of at most three 
variables. Is This is done by adding additional hidden atomic propositions, and 
“naming” binary subexpressions of the formula using the new propositions. For 
example,(((AVB)VlC)~(DVE))isconvertedinto(T,ttAVB)A(T2H 
T,VX)A(T2-DVE). 
Assuming the result is of the form A, pi,, the energy function is computed to be 
C,i H7Ps, 3 where H, is the characteristic function defined in Example 4.4. 
Convert the cubic terms in the result to quadratic ones using a high-order to 
low-order procedure of Section 3.4. 
- _ 
” In these papers we were concerned only with weak equivalence, but it is easily shown that strong equivalence 
holds. 
I5 In contrast to the familiar MAT. connectives in a subformula are not limited to disjunctions of literals. 
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The global minima of the energy function are exactly equal to the satisfying models 
of the WFF. Propositional calculus is therefore weakly equivalent to the calculus of 
quadratic energy functions and can be used as a high-level language to describe SCNs. 
However, two limitations exist: ( 1) the algorithm (in [40] ) that converts an energy 
function to a satisfiable WFF may generate an exponentially long WFF; and (2) the 
equivalence is weak. It means that although the WFF and the energy function have 
the same set of satisfying models, neither evidence can be added nor the probabilistic 
interpretation is preserved. 
4.4. The equivalence of penalty logic and SCNs 
This section shows that penalty logic and SCNs are strongly equivalent: Every penalty 
logic formula can be represented eficiently in an SCN and every SCN can be described 
efficiently by a penalty logic formula. 
When a PLOFF $ is strongly equivalent to a network described by an energy function 
E then: 
( 1) The set of global minima of E is equal exactly to the set of the preferred models 
of cp. 
(2) Both knowledge representations induce the same order on the possible mod- 
els; i.e., s is “better” than s’ iff ErunkE(s) < ErankE(s’) iff VrankJ, (s) < 
Vrunk+ (s’) . 
(3) Knowledge update is cumulative. An addition (deletion) to the knowledge base 
can be done by merging (subtracting) the new PLOFF with the existing one. 
The equivalent operation in the energy space is adding the energy terms of the 
new PLOFF to the energy function representing the old one. The update of a 
network with a new piece of knowledge is therefore modular and simple. 
4.4.1. Representing penalty logic using SCNs 
Theorem 4.10. For every PLOFF Cc, = {(pi, (pi) 1 i = 1, . , . , n} there exists a strongly 
equivalent quadratic energy function E(x’, ?); i.e., there exist a constant c such that 
Vranke = ErankE + c. The size of the network that is generated by E is of the same 
order as the length of (I/; i.e., the number of symbols in J/. 
Construction. We can construct E from rC, using the following procedure: 
(1) Start with an empty set of assumptions $‘. For every pair (pi, cp) in +, create a 
new hidden variable Ti, “name” cpi using Ti cf (pi and add the pairs (co, 7;: ++ pi) 
and (pi, Ti) into $‘. The penalty 00 represents a real value that is large enough to 
force the “naming” constraint to be satisfied. The original penalty pi causes the 
7;:‘s to compete with each other; while the high penalty 00 guarantees that if c 
holds (among the winning theories) then pi also holds. (CI’ is therefore strongly 
equivalent to J/ and the Ti’S may be considered as hidden variables. 
(2) Construct the energy function ci OOE~~~, - cj pjTj, where Eq is the function 
generated by the algorithm described in Example 4.9. 
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Proof. To show Vranke = ErankE + c: If the hidden units T in E are free to settle to 
a minimum, then for any clamping of the visible variables, EOO~+++,, always obtains the 
minimum value c, of this function by setting 7;: to true if (pi is satisfied, and to false if 
p, is violated. Therefore, 
ErankE (I) = e ‘:‘-~P,=~C,--&;+ c p; 
FI +v, FI !=I -(Ib,) 
=c pI + c = Vrank& - c. 0 
7ti+$q I 
The “naming” of the first step is needed only if the number of variables in an 
assumption C,D~ is greater than three. If this is the case and we do not “name” pi, then the 
second step of the algorithm might generate more then one “triple”. Each triple will have 
a penalty that will contribute to the energy function independently of the other triples, 
and the constraint as a whole will not have the atomicity we expect. Thus, the ranking 
function that will be generated will not be the one we wished. The high penalty we use 
for the “naming” causes the system to always find solutions that satisfy the “naming” 
constraints. Once we guarantee that all the “naming” constraints are satisfied, all that is 
needed is to make the 7;‘s compete as if they were the original assumptions. When the 
number of variables is less or equal to three, the way we construct the energy function 
guarantees that only one triple is generated. Thus, either the constraint is satisfied as a 
whole (with zero penalty) or it is not satisfied (and the penalty is p,); i.e., the splitting 
of one constraint into more then one “triple” does not happen, and the atomicity is 
preserved. 
The network that is generated can be seen as performing a search for a preferred 
model of 9. According to the sound and complete proof theory, it can also be seen as 
searching for a preferred theory of I+!J; i.e., the T,‘s that win the competition correspond 
to the assumptions in the preferred theory found. 
In the following example the assumptions have less than four variables, thus “naming” 
is not needed. 
Example 4.11 (The Nixon diamond case of Example 2.2). The PLOFF that is to be 
converted is: 
9 = {(300O,N),(1000,N ---t Q), (1000, N + R), (10,Q + P), (10, R + 4’)). 
No “naming” is needed, so 9’ = 9. Each of the pairs is converted to an energy function: 
1000 N --f R 1000(E,NvR) = lOOO( N - NR), 
1000 N--tQ 1000(&h,“Q) = lOOO( N - NQ), 
10 R + TP 10(E_R~+) = lO(RP), 
IO Q-P lO(~F,~vp) = lO(Q - QP), 
3000 N 3000( EN) = 3000(-N). 
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Summing the energy terms together: 
E = -1OOONQ - 1OOONR + 1ORP - 1OQP - lOOON + 1OQ. 
The corresponding network appears in Fig. 4. 
Fig. 4. The network that represents the Nixon diamond example. It corresponds to the energy function: 
E = -10001VQ - IOOONR + 1ORP - 1OQP - lOOON + 1OQ. 
Example 4.12. Converting the “meeting” example, we first show in Table 1 the general 
case with “naming” (it is used for demonstration purposes only, since the assumptions 
have less than four variables). 
The energy function we get by summing the energy of the assumptions is: 
1000T&M - lOOOT3CM - 1oooT4cs - 2000T*M + 1OOOr,s + lOOOT2M 
+2OOOT3C - lOOOT3M + 2OOOT4C - lOOOT4S + 1OOOM - 2000C + 999rt 
-201 OT2 - 1 lOOT3 - 2OOOT4. 
It is shown as a cubic symmetric network in Fig. 5(a) and as a quadratic network in 
Fig. 5(b). Since the assumptions in our example have less than three variables each, 
we can generate a simpler (strongly equivalent) network from the energy function of 
CipiE,, = 1(-M) + lOO(C - CM) + lOOO(C - CS) (see Fig. 5(c)). 
Table 1 
Example 4.12: general case 
Penalty WFF &+(x3 
1000 Tl - meeting lOOO(T~ - 2TlM + M) 
1000 T2 +-+ (sick + ( 7 meeting) ) lOOO(T2SM - 2T2 - S - M + T2S + T2M) 
1000 T3 - ( cold-only + meeting) lOOO( -T3 - C + 2T3C + M - T3M - T3CM) 
1000 T4 ++ (cold-only -+ sick) lOOO( -T4 - C + 2T4C + S - T4S - T4CS) 
1 Tl -lTl 
10 T2 -1OT2 
100 T3 -1OOT3 
1000 T4 - 1 OOOT4 
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s 
-10 
M 4 1 1000 100 -21 
Fig. 5. Equivalent symmetric networks Ihr the meeting example (the numbers in the circles are thresholds): 
(a) cubic; (b) quadratic: and (c) quadratic for the simple conversion ( o naming). 
Once it is possible to generate a network that searches for preferred models (or 
preferred theories), it is possible to construct a network that will reason according to 
our definition of entailment. A construction of such network is described in Section 5. 
4.4.2. Representing SCNs us penalty logic ,formulas 
This subsection shows that it is possible to describe efficiently any network by a 
penalty logic formula. The motivation here is to demonstrate that penalty logic is 
an efficient and compact language for specification of symmetric connectionist net- 
works. 
Theorem 4.13. Eve? energy function E is strongly equivalent to some PLOFF $; i.e., 
there exists a constant c such that ErunkE = Vrank$ + c. 
Construction. The following algorithm generates a strongly equivalent PLOFF from an 
energy 
(1) 
(2) 
function: 
Eliminate hidden variables (if’ any) from the energy function, using the algorithm 
of Section 3.4. 
The energy function (with no hidden variables) is now brought into a sum- 
of-products form and is converted into a PLOFF in the following way: Let 
E(.?) = I:‘:, w,, nii, x’!,, be the energy function. We construct a PLOFF 
The formula that is generated is strongly equivalent to the original energy 
(network). The size of the formula is in the order of the size of the original 
(linear in the number of connections). 
function 
network 
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Proof. To show Vrank* = ErankE + c: 
Vrank+ (2) = c -wi + c Wl 
w,<OA~(~~/jX,,,) WWx’~-(/\ X/# )) 
c Wi + c W 
w;<O/+l( A x,,, ) W/>OAx’!F( A x,,, ) 
=- c Wi + c Wi + c WI 
w;<o w,m+/j x,,, wrmm/1 x/,, I
=CwinXi,,+cwlnX~,,-cwi 
Wi<O It wr>O n WI 40 
= ErankE + c. 0 
Example 4.14. Looking at the network of Fig. 4, we would like to describe this network 
as a PLOFF. The energy function is: 
The 
The 
The 
E = - 1OOOh’Q - 1OOONR + 1ORP - 1OQP - IOOON + 1OQ. 
negative terms are: 
(IOOOJVAQ), (1000,N~R), (lO,QAP), (1000,N). 
positive terms are: 
(10,lR v +), (10, -Q). 
final PLOFF is therefore: 
(lOOO,Nr\Q), (lOOO,NAR), (lO,QAP), 
(lOOO,N), (10,~RV+‘), (10,-Q). 
Note that as it is usually the case with reverse-compilation, the formula we get is not 
very meaningful; however, it is clear that a compact description exists for every network. 
5. A connectionist inference engine 
Suppose a background PLOFF 9, an evidence PLOFP e, and a query which is a 
(strict) standard logic WFF 9. We would like to construct a connectionist network to 
answer one of the possible three answers: ( 1) tC, u e k (p; (2) (I, U e k (-I(P) ; or (3) 
both @ p 40 and $ F (740) (“ambiguous”). 
Intuitively, our connectionist engine is built from two subnetworks, each of which is 
trying to find a satisfying model for rl, ; e. The first subnetwork is biased to search 
for a preferred model which satisfies also p, whereas the second subnetwork is biased 
to search for a preferred model which satisfies ~rp. If two such models exist, then we 
conclude that 40 is “ambiguous” (@ 6 e entails neither 50 nor -a). If no preferred model 
also satisfies p, we conclude that @ U e k up, and if no model also satisfies asp, we 
230 
Table 2 
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fi searches for a preferred model of Cc, that satisfies also P 
U*’ searches for a preferred model of 1+4 that satisfies also YP 
U{(C (QUERYP - PI)} bias @ to search for a model that satisfies P 
U{(E,(QMRY~ -+ (+‘)I)} bias I// to search for a model that satisfies ( YP’) 
U{(E, (P A ,P’) + AMBfGUOUSp)} if two satisfying models exist that do not agree on P, we 
conclude “AA4BIGCKlUS” 
U{(.s, (P ++ P’) + ( -AMB/CUOUSp))} if despite the bias we are unable to find two such satisfying 
models we conclude NOT ambiguous. 
conclude that $ U e b p. For simplicity let us first assume that the evidence e is a strict 
conjunction of literals (atomic propositions or their negation) and that 9 is a single 
atomic proposition. Later we’ll describe a general solution. 
To implement this intuition we first need to duplicate our background knowledge 
Cc, and create its copy rl/’ by naming all the atomic propositions A using A’. For 
each atomic proposition P that might participate in a query, we then add two more 
propositions: “QUERYp” and “AMBIGUOUS~“. QUERYp is used to initiate a query P; 
it will be externally clamped by the user, when he or she inquires about P. The unit 
“AMBIGUOUSp” represents the answer of the system. It will be set to TRUE if we can 
conclude neither that +G entails P nor that 9 entails 7P. 
Our inference engine can be therefore described (in the language of penalty logic) 
as in Table 2 
Using the algorithm of Theorem 4.10, we generate the corresponding network. The 
network that is generated for the Nixon example is shown in Fig. 6. 
Fig. 6. Inference network for the Nixon diamond case: the two rings represents two similar subnetwork: One 
searches for a preferred model that satisfies the query and the other searches for a preferred model the falsifies 
the query. 
To initiate a query about P the user externally clamps the unit QUERYp. This causes 
a small positive bias E to be sent to unit P and a small negative bias --E to be sent to 
P’. Each of the two subnetworks Cc, and r+V, searches for a global minimum (a satisfying 
model) of the original PLOFF. The bias (E) is small enough so it does not introduce 
new global minima for each of the subnetworks. It may however, constrain the set of 
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global minima. If a satisfying model that also satisfies the bias exists, then this model 
is in the new set of global minima of +. The new set of global minima is the set of all 
preferred models of I#J that also satisfy the query. If no preferred model also satisfies the 
query then the set of global minima is unaffected by the bias and the network searches 
for one of those models. 
The network therefore tries to find models that satisfy also the bias rules. If it 
succeeds, we conclude “AMBIGUOUS”, otherwise we conclude that all the satisfying 
models agree on the same truth value for the query. The “AMBIGUOUS” proposition 
is then set to “false”, and the answer whether $ b p or whether ti b ~rp can be found 
in the unit P. If P is “true” then the answer is $ b 5p since P holds in all satisfying 
models. Similarly, if P is false, we conclude that + /= ~4p. 
When the evidence is a strict conjunction of literals, the user may add it to the 
background network simply by clamping the appropriate atomic propositions whenever 
a new evidence is observed. In the general case we need to combine an arbitrary 
evigence e and an arbitrary query (D: We do this by building an inference network for 
9 U e U {(co, P ++ p)} and by querying about P, a new atomic proposition. 
The network that was generated converges to the correct answer if it manages to 
find a global minimum. An annealing schedule l6 like in [ 171 may be used for such 
search. A slow enough annealing is certain to find a global minimum and therefore 
the correct answer, but it might take exponential time. Since the problem is NP-hard, 
we will probably not find an algorithm that will always give us the correct answer in 
polynomial time. However, attempts to accelerate the search for special instances of 
the problem are continuously being made (see for example [45] ). Traditionally in AI, 
knowledge representation systems trades the expressiveness of the language they use 
with the time complexity they allow [ 281, ” and the accuracy of the answer is usually 
not sacrificed. The inference mechanism described in this section, as in [ 51, trades the 
time resources with the accuracy of the answer. Only limited time resources are given, 
and we wish to stop the search when this limit is reached. The annealing schedule can 
be planned to fit the time limitation, and an answer is always given at the end of the 
process. Although the answer may be incorrect, the system is able to improve its guess 
as more time resources are given. 
6. Learning propositional formulas 
So far, we have seen that networks can be compiled from logic formulas. However, 
much of the appeal of connectionist models is their ability to learn from examples. 
This section shows that SCNs can learn unknown propositional formulas inductively, 
and develop incrementally a representation that is equal to the ones constructed by 
compiling formulas. 
Assume the network tries to learn an unknown formula p by looking at the set of 
the satisfying truth assignments of 4p. For simplicity, let us assume that the formula to 
I6 There are also other techniques for improving the chances to escape from local minima [ 15,211. 
I7 Connectionist systems like [ 591 and [ 191 trade expressiveness with time complexity. 
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learn is a satisfiable WFF. The task of the network is to update its weights in such 
a way that at the end of the learning process the energy function is equal to the one 
obtained by translating 40 into E,. Clearly, by doing so, the set of global minima of the 
energy function is equal to the set of satisfying models of (o (r,) which is the training 
set. 
We may look at the process as learning of associative memories: Given a set of 
vectors to be stored as memories, assuming that those vectors are the satisfying models 
of some unknown formula, we would like to construct a network such that the global 
minima of its energy function are exactly equal to the vectors presented. I8 
The algorithm that will be described uses high-order units (hyper-arcs) ; however, the 
reader should remember that it is always possible to convert the hyper-arcs into pairwise 
connections by adding hidden units (see Section 3.4). 
Definition 6.1. A k-CNF is a WFF that is formed as a conjunction (AND) of clauses, 
where each clause is a disjunction (OR) of up to k literals. A literal is either an atomic 
proposition or a negated (7) atomic proposition. 
For example (A V 1B) A (-A V -C V D) is a 3-CNF that is composed of two clauses: 
the first contains two literals and the second contains three. 
I shall present now a new learning rule for symmetric connections (possibly high- 
order arcs) and a fast learning algorithm that learns an unknown k-CNF formula from the 
truth assignments that satisfy the formula. These truth assignments represent the possible 
realities that satisfy the unknown rule; they are called also examples or presentations. 
After each presentation the network is updated, and the corresponding energy func- 
tion is guaranteed to have a set of global minima that is exactly equal to the set 
of presentations seen so far. Therefore, assuming we know the k of the unknown k- 
CNF formula, the desired network is generated after a single scan over the training 
set. 
Note that every formula can be brought into a k-CNF form; thus, the algorithm works 
in theory for every set of presentations and for any unknown formula (p. It is not practical 
though, when k is too large. I9 
6.1. A learning rule for high-order symmetric connections 
Let an instantiation of the visible units XI.. . ,X, be a vector of zeros and ones 
.5 = (XI, , x,) , such that x; t (0, 1). A presentation is an instantiation of the visible 
units, introduced by clamping the visible units Xi with the values xi. The learning rule 
soon to be described is responsible for the update of the weight of a single l-order hyper- 
arc: It is composed of two parts: the first checks whether an arc should be updated as a 
result of the current presentation, while the second part updates the weight. 
Ix The memories in such network are content-addressable: given partial description of a stored vector, the 
network searches to complete the rest of the bits. 
I9 Fortunately, expert domains are regulated by relatively short rules and therefore small k is sufficient. 
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6. I. I. Checking whether to update the arc 
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The idea is that certain bit patterns in the training set should cause an updating of 
some weights if they are seen for the first time *O A new combination of k bits in 
the training set, causes arcs that connect units involved in this bit combination to be 
updated. A hyper-arc is updated if it connects units that participate in the new pattern 
and the rest of the units of the pattern are not active; i.e., units of the pattern that are 
not in the arc should be zero instantiated. 
6.1.2. Updating the weight 
The procedure to update a weight (once it has been determined that the arc needs to be 
updated) may be viewed as an extension of the Hebbian rule for high-order connections: 
If the number of zero units that participate in the hyper-arc is even, increase the weight; 
otherwise (odd), decrease. For the special case of a pairwise connection, we get the 
familiar rule that increases the weight if the two units have the same activation value 
(both active or both inactive) and decreases the weight otherwise. 
61.3. The k-clause learning rule (formally) 
Let Arc = {Xi,, . . . , Xii} be an Z-order arc. 
Given a presentation x’ = (x1, . . . , x, ) that instantiates the visible units to O/ 1 values, 
the l-order arc Arc is updated iff there exists a new k-bit pattern P = (Xi, = xi,, . . . , Xi, = 
Xi, 9 X,jl = 0, . . . 7 9 Xjk_1 = 0) that has never been seen in one of the earlier presentations, 
and that includes the units of Arc, such that the rest of the units (Xj, , . . . , Xjh_, ) are 
zero-instantiated. If this condition holds, then the weight of Arc is incremented (+l ) if 
the number of zero units in Arc is even (including the all ones case), and is decremented 
(- 1) if the number of zeros is odd. 
Example 6.2. Given the presentation ABC = 011, a 2-clause rule causes the following 
updates: 
l The weight of arc AB is updated by Nan = - 1, since the 2-bit combination 
(A = 0, B = 1) is new and the arc contains an odd number of zeros. 
l The weight of BC is updated by n ~c = +l, since the 2-bit combination (B = 
1, C = 1) is new to the arc and the arc contains no zeros (even). 
l The bias of unit B (which is the singleton arc {B}) is updated by An = +l, 
since the 2-bit combination A = 0, B = 1 is new to the arc B, it is extended using 
zero-units (A = 0) and the arc B includes no zeros (even). 
The bias of A is not updated since it cannot be extended into a 2-bit combination by 
adding a zero unit. In a similar way, the arc AC is decremented (like AB), and the bias 
C is incremented (like the bias B). 
*” This is a one-shot learning: once a pattern is seen, it is captured completely and is not needed any longer; 
i.e., multiple occurrences of the same pattern do not provide us with more information. In contrast to Bayesian 
learning, the probability that a bit combination occurs is irrelevant to the rule we want to learn. A single 
presentation or a hundred repetitions generate the same representation. 
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6.2. Learning k-CNF 
to start 
connections as more examples are being presented. Each time 
an example appears, the weights change so that the global minima includes the new 
example. The network, however, does not grow linearly with the presentations, 
regularities of the presentations). 
Theorem 6.3. v the presentations are truth assignments that satisfy some unknown 
k-CNF formula cpq then the algorithm generates a network whose global minima are 
exactly the set of presentations qf the k-CNF f ormula, and whose energy function is 
equal E,. The network is generated after u single pass over the presentations. 
Proof. Only a sketch of the proof is given: 
The proof is based on showing that the algorithm is equivalent to Valiant’s algorithm 
for learning k-CNF [ 681. Valiant’s algorithm starts with a list of clauses that consists of 
all possible k-clauses over n atomic propositions. For every presentation of a truth as- 
signment that satisfies the unknown k-CNF (positive example) the algorithm eliminates 
clauses from the list that are not satisfied by the example. 
It can be proved that in every step, the conjunction of the clauses in the list is 
a formula that is consistent with all the presentations seen so far and exactly these 
presentations. Therefore, when all the examples are seen, the k-CNF formula has been 
learned. 
First. we need to show that the initial conjunction of all possible k-clauses can be 
represented by a network with zero weights (the initialization step of our algorithm). 
Later, we show that the clause elimination step is equivalent to the set of weight updates 
performed after each presentation. 
An energy function of zero (or any constant energy function) represents formulas that 
are contradictions or tautologies that have the property that every model satisfies exactly 
the same number of clauses. The initial conjunction of all possible clauses in Valiant’s 
algorithm is exactly such formula and therefore, the starting point of our algorithm (with 
the zero weights) represents the desired list. 
The next step is to show that the set of weight updates performed by the k-clause rule 
after one presentation corresponds to Valiant’s elimination step. A clause is eliminated 
in Valiant’s algorithm if it is a disjunction 
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ofsomek-bitpatternP=(Xi,=l,..., Xinl=l,I;,=O ,..., $,=O),wheretheXi,‘sare 
instantiated by the example to one, and the Yi,,‘s to zero. An elimination of a clause c 
is performed in the energy space by deleting the energy terms of E,. Since the weights 
of the network are the energy terms with reverse signs, the weights are actually updated 
by adding: 
The arcs that are updated as a result of this addition, contain the units Xi!‘s in the pattern 
P that are instantiated with ones, while the rest of units are zeros (in P but not in the 
arc). If the number of zeros in the arc is odd, the sign of the term n Xi, fl c, that 
corresponds to the arc is negative and the weight is decremented. If the number of zeros 
is even, the sign is positive and the weight is incremented. An arc is updated therefore 
if there exists a new bit combination P, whose one’s are included in the arc (if any), 
while the rest of the bits of the combination (outside the arc) are all zeros. 0 
Example 6.4. Learning the XOR formula (A $ B) H C, looking at the four satisfying 
truth assignments: ABC l {011,101,000, 110). 
We need a 3-clause rule since we cannot express our formula in less than 3-CNF. The 
patterns we look for are therefore 3-bit combinations (the presentations themselves). 
Given the presentation ABC = 011: 
nABc = - 1 (odd number of zeros) ; 
ABC = +1 (even number of zeros) ; 
Given 
n ABC = -1 (odd); n~c = +l (even); 
Given ABC = 000: 
n*Bc = -1; &c = +1; n,, = +1; &B = +1; 
n* = -1; & = -1; nc=-1; 
Given ABC = 110: 
&Bc -1; A,JB +1; 
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(a) Co) 
Fig. 7. The network for XOR (A e B) - C that was constructed by the learning algorithm: (a) is the 
high-order network; (b) is the quadratic equivalent with one hidden unit H. 
k-clause learning rule for an entire cycle and then to test whether the network performs 
well. If the network passes the test, the algorithm stops; otherwise, k is increased and 
another cycle of learning begins. 
62.2. A general scheme for learning k-CNF when k is unknown 
( 1) k = 1; /* try monomials first */ 
(2) Activate k-clause learning rule on all the examples of the training set; 
(3) TEST: if the network performs sufficiently well, stop; 
(4) k=k+l; 
(5) Goto (2). 
One approach to the TEST (line 3 of the above scheme) is discussed in [ 141 and 
is related to Valiant’s notion of “probably approximately correct” (PAC) learning. In 
this model, positive and negative examples are given from some arbitrary distribution. 
The task is to find in polynomial time a network whose chances to have an error rate 
(on the same distribution) larger than E are less than S, for arbitrary small E and 8. We 
would like also to make sure that the probability of the algorithm to use k larger than 
necessary are also less than 6. The approach in [ 141 satisfies the above conditions and 
guarantees that only polynomial time is needed (polynomial in n, 1 /S, 1 /E, even if 
there are exponential number of satisfying models). 
Another approach that is not PAC motivated but similar in style is when we are 
given a complete training set that contains all the satisfying assignments (only positive 
examples). The task is to generate a network that performs well (the probability of 
the network to be e-bad is less than a), and that is compact (the probability of using 
unnecessary large k, is also less than 6). 
As in the PAC case, the test in this case is also a sequence of samples of the network 
behavior; each of the checks tests whether the network converges to a wrong global 
minimum. The test procedure allows up to m errors out of r checks. 2’ If the number 
of errors is less than m then the test succeeds, otherwise, it fails and k is increased. A 
full discussion of these testing techniques is too lengthly, and the reader is referred to 
literature on learning theory and approximation theory. ** 
2’ m and r are computed from the epsilon-delta bounds using Chemoff bounds. 
22 The paper does not carry any contributions related to these techniques. I only suggest their adaptation for 
the testing phase of step three of the general learning scheme. 
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7. Experimental results 
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Experiments have been made on randomly generated propositional formulas. The 
formulas that were generated were conjunctions of 3-variable clauses (3-SAT). 23 The 
simulations have managed to find satisfying solutions to large scale 3-SAT problems 
with remarkable speed. Performance comparison of several symmetric models and the 
GSAT algorithm [57] are provided. 
7.1. Simulations 
I have tried three types of algorithms inspired from Hopfield networks, Boltzmann 
machines and mean field networks.24 
7.1.1. The Hopjield version 
Perform MAXTRIES tries or until a solution is found: 
In each try: 
l Randomly set the values of the units (zeros and ones). 
l Perform Hopfield cycles until either MAXCYCLES cycles have been executed, a 
solution is found or until MAXCONST continuous cycles have been performed 
without reducing the energy. 
A Hopfield cycle is one that asynchronously updates all the units that need to be 
updated (each unit is updated only once) by randomly selecting a unit that has not been 
selected before in this cycle, and updating its value in the following way: 
l If neti > 0, the unit becomes one; 
l If neti < 0, the unit becomes zero; 
l If neti = 0, the unit value is flipped. 
7.1.2. The Boltzmann version 
Do until MAXT tries or until a solution is found: 
In each try: 
l Assign random (zero/one) values to the units. 
l Anneal the system, starting with temp=l until temp=O: 
- Perform a Boltzmann cycle; 
- Reduce temp by l/TEMPSTEPS. 
When the temperature is zero, Hopfield cycles are executed until either MAXCY- 
CLES tries have been performed,2’ a solution has been found, or MAXCONST 
continuous cycles could not reduce the energy. 
l If MAXTRIES tries have not been executed and a solution hasn’t been found, 
another annealing begins with TEMPSTBPS=TEMPSTEPS+DELTAT (annealing 
slows). 
27 3-SAT problems are convenient for a benchmark because performance results of several other algorithms 
am available to compare. 
24 William Chen assisted me during the experiments both with ideas and with the programming. 
25 The number of cycles includes those executed during the annealing. 
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A Boltzmann cycle is an asynchronous update of all the units (every unit is visited 
in random order but only once). flipping their value stochastically with a probability 
which is a function of net; and the temperature (see Section 3.2.3). 
7.1.3. The mean field version 
As in the Boltzmann version, the simulator tries MAXTRIES annealings (each time 
the annealing is slower); however, the first annealing is done using mean field theory 
(MFT) cycles (see Section 3.2.4). while the rest of the annealings are done using 
Boltzmann cycles. 26 
A MFT cycle is an asynchronous update of all the units (as in Boltzmann cycle). The 
units are selected in random order , and each unit in its turn updates its own activation 
value using the activation function for MET. 
7.2. The experiments 
Random 3-SAT formulas of II variables and m clauses were generated in the following 
way : 
l Generate a random truth assignment; i.e., zero/one vector of n bits. The formula 
to be generated will be satisfied by this assignment. 
l Starting with an empty formula, until m clauses are added: 
- Randomly generate a 3-variable clause (selection of 3 out of n variables). 
- If the clause is new and is satisfied by the assignment, then add the new clause 
to the formula. 
In the experiments conducted, a ratio of 4.3 between the number of clauses and the 
number of variables (m/n) was kept. This ratio was found to generate “hard” satis- 
fiability problems [34].” One hundred formulas were generated for each of 50, 70, 
100, 120 and 200 variables, and only 50 formulas were generated for 300, 400 and 500 
variables. The parameters used for the simulations appear in Table 3. 
During the final stages of experiments2* two recent algorithms that perform a very 
similar local search for satisfiability and may be seen as sequential variations of Hopfield 
networks became known to us [ 13,571. In GSAT [57], maximum MAXTRIES tries 
are executed. In each try a random truth assignment is generated and variable “flips” 
arc performed until tither a solution is found or MAXTRIES flips were performed. 
In each flip, only one of the variables is selected for flipping. The variable to be 
flipped is selected randomly among the variables which when flipped cause the largest 
xi Trying more MFT cycles is not a good strategy because MFf is deterministic. 
27 The way we generate the formulas is different from I34 1. Our generator forces the formulas to be satisfiable, 
whereas in I34 1, random formulas are generated that are not forced to be satisfiable and later the Davis-Putnam 
algorithm 141 (which is based on resolution) is used to eliminate the unsatisfiable formulas. Our approach 
seems to make the distribution generated easier than that of [ 34) (B. Selman, private communication). 
Nevertheless, the comparisons to GSAT are still valid since all experiments were conducted with the same set 
of formulas. It remains to be seen whether similar results happen in unforced distributions. 
2X Our experimental design, which began after the presentation of the connectionist approach in the AAAI 
Spring Symposium of 1991, had a different idea for random generation of satisfiability problems. We changed 
our benchmark design to meet the ratio reported in [ 34 1. 
Table 3 
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n m MAXTBIES MAXCYCLES MAXCONST TBMPSTBPS DELTAT 
50 215 50 250 20 8 1 
70 301 50 350 20 11 I 
100 430 100 500 60 15 I 
120 516 250 600 60 14 1 
200 860 500 200 60 28 2 
300 1275 2000 6000 120 35 5 
400 1700 2500 8000 170 50 5 
500 2150 3000 10000 200 77 5 
Table 4 
n m GSAT Hopfield Boltzmann MFf 
50 215 268.22 24.64 24.04 18.73 
70 301 436.43 33.37 28.36 13.14 
100 430 1095.35 69.43 83.89 55.59 
120 516 1374.47 49.99 59.04 33.05 
200 860 4817 85.92 88.39 46.78 
300 1275 8771.8 105.2 101.68 55.92 
400 1700 16247 154.32 129.14 106.26 
500 2150 50664 297.82 233.54 152.06 
increase in satisfied clauses (largest absolute gradient). GSAT has been reported to 
perform significantly better than the Davis-Putnam algorithm which is one of the most 
popular algorithms for satisfiability [4]. We have implemented GSAT for the purpose 
of comparing the approaches. In [ 131, all the variables which increase the number of 
satisfied clauses are flipped. The algorithm of [ 131 was not directly implemented by 
us because of its close similarity to the Hopfield version.29 For the purpose of fair 
comparison with GSAT, the values for n, m and the MAXTRIES and MAXCYCLES 
parameters were taken from the experiments reported in [ 571. The rest of the parameters 
(MAXCONST, TEMPSTEPS and DELTAT) were intuitively taken according to the size 
of the problem. 3o No fine tuning of these parameters was done. 
Table 4 gives the average number of cycles in which each of the algorithms found a 
solution. 
Table 5 shows the percentage of experiments in which each of the algorithms managed 
to find a solution in the first trial. 
The reader should note that the comparison with GSAT is based on parallel execution. 
A cycle (a GSAT flip or a single update of all the units) is assumed to run on parallel 
architecture and to take a constant time. The number of flips in a cycle was not counted 
2g The difference is that in [ 131 nodes are visited in a predefined order, and the vector that is generated when 
the algorithm fails is not truly random. 
3(’ The TEMPSTEPS parameter was taken to be approximately 0.75 of the average number of cycles which 
Hopfield had in a successful try. 
240 
Table S 
G. Pinktrs/Arti$ciul Intelligence 77 (I 995) 203-247 
V1 GSAT Hopfield Boltzmann MFT 
21s 
301 
330 
5 I 6 
860 
1275 
1700 
2150 
69% 81% 94% 
61% 83% 94% 
68% 70%’ 93% 
65% 71% 87% 
66% 83% 96% 
74% 90% 96% 
80% 88%’ 94% 
66% 86% 92% 
since all the flips in a cycle are done in one parallel step (constant time). j’ Note also 
that GSAT was not designed for parallel execution; the comparison could have been 
very different had we measured flips and not cycles. 
For parallel execution, the connectionist approaches are clearly leading. Not surpris- 
ingly, MFT has the best performance for first-hit. 
8. Related work and discussion 
8. I. Connectimist approuches 
Derthick [5] observed that weighted logical constraints (which he called “certain- 
ties”) can be used in massively parallel architecture. Derthick translated those constraints 
into special energy functions and used them to implement a subset of the language KL- 
ONE. The approach described in this paper has some similarities with his system. 
Looking at his reduction from logic to energy functions (Derthick uses different en- 
ergy functions and no hidden units), there are however, several basic differences: (1) 
Derthick’s “mundane” reasoning is based on finding a most likely single model; his 
system is never skeptical. The system described in this paper is more cautious and 
closer in its behavior to symbolic nonmonotonic systems, described in recent literature 
(see Section 8.2). (2) The system that is described here can be implemented with 
standard low-order units, using relatively well-studied architectures like Hopfield net- 
works or Boltzmann machines. It is possible therefore to take advantage of the hardware 
implementations as well as of the learning algorithms that were developed for these 
networks. (3) Formal proofs of two-way equivalence are given so that every network 
can be described as a PLOFF and not just the reverse. (4) A learning algorithm is given 
that achieves the same networks that are obtained from direct compilation. 
Another connectionist nonmonotonic system is that of Shastri [ 581. It uses evidential 
reasoning based on maximum likelihood to reason in inheritance networks. My approach 
is different; I use standard low-level connectionist models and am not restricted to 
I’ Constant time for a cycle is certainly true for the parallel connection& approaches: however, a constant 
time for parallel GSAT cycles is not so obvious. 1 conjecture, however, that a GSAT cycle can be computed 
in a constant average time with a suitable parallel architecture. 
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inheritance networks.32 Shastri’s system is guaranteed to work and has a polynomial 
time complexity, whereas the system described here tries to solve an intractable problem 
and trades correctness with time; i.e., a correct solution (a global minimum) is not 
guaranteed; however, the chance of finding one improves as more time is given. 
This article shares with [ 1,19,59,65] the implementationalist motivation [ 481. These 
systems implement small subsets of predicate calculus by either spreading activation or 
by rule firing. The expressive power of these mechanisms is limited by performance 
and tractability considerations, and they all stress the problems of representing complex 
structures, syntax sensitivity and multi-place predicates. In this article I had no intention 
of attacking these problems; rather, I intended to show how to represent any propositional 
constraint, and how networks can cope naturally with conflicting beliefs. The technique 
however, can be extended further for representing first-order predicate calculus [ 431. 
We may look at penalty logic as one of the layers of abstraction that are needed 
between descriptions of high-level cognitive processes and low-level neural implemen- 
tations. Thus, penalty logic may be seen as a first level of abstraction that is higher than 
the neural implementation (see [l] for a nice discussion on the multi-span approach). 
Using the language described in this paper we can map several of the systems mentioned 
above into penalty logic, and then compile them into symmetric networks (possibly by 
sacrificing efficiency) [ 421. 
8.2. Symbolic systems 
Penalty logic is along the lines of work done in preferential semantics [60], and 
is related in particular to systems with preferential semantics that use ranked models, 
like those of Lehmann and Magidor [27], Lehmann [26] or Pearl [ 371. 33 Lehmann 
and Magidor’s results about the relationship between rational consequence relations and 
ranked models can be applied to our paradigm: A strict consequence relation (induced 
by a PLOFF $) is a binary relation between a strict evidence and a strict conclusion. 
It is therefore a set of pairs Rg = {(p’, 40) 1 p’ /=’ cp}, where both p’ and 40 are 
strict WFFs. Lehmann and Magidor defined a rational consequence relation as one that 
satisfies certain conditions (inference rules), and proved that a consequence relation is 
rational iff it is defined by some ranking function. As a result, we may conclude a rather 
strong conclusion for our system: Every rational consequence relation is implementable 
in a symmetric network. Also, any symmetric network may be viewed as implementing 
some rational consequence relation. We can therefore be sure that every implementation 
of our connectionist inference engine induces a rational consequence relation. 
Penalty Iogic is not based on Bayes reasoning. It was developed using the notion 
of preferential semantics. On the surface, it does not compute probabilities nor does 
it based on Cox axioms. However, tight relationships have been discovered between 
systems based on preferential semantics and systems based on epsilon semantics 34 that 
32 We can easily extend our approach to handle inheritance networks by looking at the atomic propositions 
as predicates with free variables. Those variables are bound by the user during query time. 
M These systems are related in turn to probabilistic reasoning (Bayes systems) by means of epsilon semantics. 
34 In e’psflon semantics probabilities approach zero or one. 
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are based on the Bayesian approach [ 10-121. One such system (based on probabilistic 
interpretation) that can be reduced directly to penalty logic is that of Goldszmidt and 
Pearl [ 121 which actually computes the penalties from a given conditional knowledge 
based on maximal entropy considerations (the user does not specify any penalty). The 
system uses the same ranking function as the one described in this article; i.e., summing 
the penalties of violated beliefs. 
Penalty logic has some similarities with systems that are based on priorities (given 
to beliefs). One such system [ 31 is based on levels of reliability. Brewka’s system 
for propositional logic can be mapped (approximately) into penalty logic by selecting 
large enough penalties. Systems such as that of Poole [50] (with strict specificity) 
can also be implemented using our architecture, and as in [ 111, the penalties can be 
generated automatically. Another system that is based on priorities is system Z+ [ 121 
where the user does specify the penalties, but there is a “ghost” that changes them so 
that several nice properties hold (e.g. specificity). Penalty logic can only approximate 
priority systems by assigning scaled penalties. 35 Every conclusion that is entailed in a 
priority system such as system Z+ will also be entailed by the approximating penalty 
logic knowledge base. However, some conclusions that are ambiguous in a priority 
system may be drawn decisively in penalty logic. In this sense penalty logic can be 
considered as bolder (less cautious) than those which are based on priorities [47]. 
For example consider the “penguins and the wings” case [ 121. We are given the 
following defaults: birds fly; birds have wings; penguins are birds and penguins do 
not fly. Many systems based on priorities (like Z+) will not be able to conclude that 
penguins have wings. Penalty logic in contrast will conclude according to our intuition; 
i.e., that penguins do have wings despite the fact that penguins do not fly. The reason 
for this intuitive deduction is that penalty logic considers the models where penguins do 
not fly but have wings to be more “normal” than models where penguins do not fly and 
also have no wings (as in [ 1 I]). Priority-based system will be ambiguous since they 
don’t have such fine preference. 
For another example consider the Nixon case (Example 2.2) when we add to it: 
(1000,/V 4 FF) and (10,FF + ‘P) (Nixon is also a football fan and football fans 
tend not to be pacifist). Most other nonmonotonic systems will still be skeptical about 
P [ 10,26,30,37,64]. Our system boldly, and in contrast with intuition, decides -P 
since it is better to defeat the one assumption supporting P than the two assumptions 
supporting 1P. In this particular case however, we can correct this behavior by changing 
the penalty for Q ---f P (multiplying by two). Further, a network like our system that 
learns, may adjust the penalties autonomously and thus develop its own intuition and 
nonmonotonic behavior. 
Because we do not allow for arbitrary partial orders [ 10,601 of the models, there 
are other fundamental s6 problematic examples where our system (and all systems with 
ranked-models semantics) boldly concludes, while other systems are skeptical (these 
are cases where the intuition tell us that skepticism is the right behavior). 
‘5 The penalties are scaled so that there is no subset of low-priority assumptions whose sum exceeds the 
penalty of a higher priority. 
76 Hector Geffner (private communication ) 
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The following is an example for which we have clear intuition; nevertheless, it is 
possible to prove that no ranking function exists that induces the intuitive behavior we 
wish: 
Example 8.1. Assume the following defeasible rules: A + D, B -+ TD and C -+ TD. 
The intuition we have states that: 
l Given A, C, D we should conclude -B; therefore, 
rank( ABCD) < rank( ABCD). 
l Given A, B, C we should conclude that D is ambiguous; therefore, 
rank( ABCD) = rank(ABCD). 
l Given A, C, D we should conclude that B is ambiguous; therefore, 
rank( ABC6) = rank( ABCD). 
l Given A, B, C we should conclude that D is ambiguous; therefore, 
rank( ABCD) = rank( ABCD). 
This is a contradiction since runk( ABCD) < runk( ABCD). Thus, the intuition as stated 
by the examples cannot be implemented by any ranked model. 
9. Conclusions 
The main contributions of this paper are: ( 1) the development of theoretical founda- 
tions for a connectionist inference engine that is capable of representing and learning 
propositional knowledge; (2) rigorously relating and unifying two (sometime opposing) 
knowledge representation mechanisms: connectionist networks and propositional logic; 
(3) demonstrating (experimentally) the efficiency of the algorithm used by SCNs for 
large scale, randomly generated 3-SAT problems. 
Along these lines I have introduced penalty logic and showed mappings between 
its sentences and SCNs. Penalty logic may be used as a framework for defeasible 
reasoning and inconsistency handling. Several systems can be mapped into this paradigm 
and therefore suggest settings of the penalties. When the right penalties are given, 
penalty logic features a nonmonotonic behavior that (usually) matches our intuition. 
It is possible to show, though, that some intuitions cannot be expressed as ranking 
functions. 
A strong equivalence between sentences of penalty logic and symmetric networks is 
formally proved. This two-way equivalence serves two purposes: ( 1) we can translate a 
sentence of penalty logic into an equivalent network (this serves the basic construction 
of our inference engine) ; (2) any symmetric network (and also any asymmetric non- 
oscillating network) can be described by penalty logic sentences. The logic may thus 
be used as a specification language (at higher level of abstraction), and gives another 
clarifying look at the dynamics of such networks. 
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Several equivalent high-level languages can be used to describe SCNs: ( 1) quadratic 
energy functions; (2) high-order energy functions with no hidden units; (3) proposi- 
tional logic; and finally (4) penalty logic. All these languages are expressive enough 
to describe any SCN and every sentence of such languages can be translated into an 
SCN; however, penalty logic has properties that make it more attractive than the other 
languages. Algorithms are given for translating between any two of the languages above. 
An inference engine is constructed that is capable of answering whether a query 
follows the formula (knowledge) or not. When a query is clamped, the global minima 
of the network correspond exactly to the correct answers. 
The engine can obtain its knowledge either by compiling a symbolic formula or by 
learning it inductively from examples. Any unknown R-CNF formula can be learned in 
linear time (in the length of the size of the training set) providing k is a small constant. 
The learning algorithm is shown to be equivalent to a powerful symbolic algorithm 
developed within the PAC paradigm. 
Revision of the knowledge and adding new evidence are easy tasks if we use penalty 
logic to describe the network: adding (or deleting) a PLOFF is simply computing the 
energy function of the new PLOFF and then adding (deleting) the energy terms to 
the function that describes the existing knowledge. Thus, a local change to the PLOFF 
describing the network is translated to a local change in the network. 
The mappings given in this paper are limited to propositional knowledge; however, 
their potential exceeds the propositional case, and allows also for higher-level more 
expressive languages (like first-order predicate logic) to be represented [ 431. 
I have implemented several nonmonotonic toy problems (like Nixon, Penguins, etc.) 
on a Boltzmann machine simulator, and the network managed to always find a global 
minimum. I have not noticed any problems with local minima although they definitely 
exist. The technique scales well for large randomly generated 3-SAT problems and there 
are evidence that similar heuristic repair methods provide good results to other NP-hard 
problems (e.g., n-queens [ 331). Advances in heuristic repair techniques (e.g., [ 361) 
or in connectionist energy minimization (e.g., [ 39,45,46] may add additional speed to 
the approach. 
The ability of these networks to learn and make adjustments in the energy landscape, 
may provide a new research direction. Learning algorithms may be used to speed up the 
network convergence time, by eliminating local minima and widening global minima. 37 
If such research is successful, the techniques described in this article may be used 
to build networks that perform fast symbolic constraint satisfaction and are able to 
accelerate their own speed with time. 
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